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Abstract
We study the aggregate e¤ects of a social security reform in a large overlapping genera-
tions model where markets are incomplete and households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
income shocks. We depart from the previous literature by assuming that, because of lack
of commitment in the credit market, the borrowing constraint in the unique asset is en-
dogenously determined by the agents’ incentives to default on previous debts. We …nd that
a model with exogenous borrowing constraints overestimates the positive e¤ect of reform-
ing social security on the capital stock and the saving rate, compared to our model with
endogenous borrowing limit. The reason is that, in the latter, the size of precautionary
savings is smaller because after the reform the incentives to default on previous debts are
lower and consequently households face more relaxed borrowing limits. Adding retirement
accounts to the basic model does not change these conclusions, although the quantitative
importance of endogenizing borrowing constraints is reduced.
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11 Introduction
The reform of social security is at the center of the political debate in most countries,
at least for two reasons: First, the aging of the population is rising concern about
the sustainability of public social security systems over the next decades. Second, in
some countries the gross private saving rate has shown a downward trend over the
last decades. For example,in the U.S. economy the private saving rate as a percent
of GDP decreased from 20.9 in 1980 to 12.7 in 2000. This trend, and its possible
negative consequences for economic growth, has exacerbated the debate about the
desirability of reducing the generosity of public pension systems as a tool to promote
savings.
In this paper, we focus on the second issue, abstracting completely from the …rst
one. The question we address is whether the lack of commitment in the credit mar-
ket is important to understand the e¤ects of reforming social security on aggregate
savings. Our answer is that when borrowing constraints are endogenous and idiosyn-
cratic income risk is important, the magnitude of the increase in the capital to output
ratio and the saving rate due to a social security reform is reduced.
Recent theoretical studies have found that reforming social security, eliminating
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system, is an important policy tool to
foster capital accumulation and savings. The seminal example of this tradition is the
deterministic model by Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987). More recently, there are some
papers that have addressed the aggregate e¤ects of social security in model economies
with idiosyncratic income risk. The work of Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Conesa and
Krueger(1999) and Storeslettenet al. (1999) are the typical examples. Perhaps closer
to the spirit of our work is the study by Fuster (1999). She …nds that introducing
altruism in a large overlapping generations model substantially reduces the e¤ect of
eliminating social security on the capital stock.
One common feature of these studies is that individuals face exogenous borrowing
constraints (in fact, no borrowing restrictions) and consequently have not accounted
for the possible e¤ect that a change in the social security regime may have on the
incentives to default on previous debts. Without commitment, …nancial intermedi-
aries take into account an individual rationality constraint from the borrower’s side,
namely, that the value of paying back the debt is no less than the value of defaulting
and accepting the legal punishment (normally associated to some level of exclusion
from the credit market in the future). Hence, changes in the economic environment
like a social security reform are likely to a¤ect the relative value of default and the
endogenous borrowing limit associated to it. In an environment with idiosyncratic
income risk, the reform could then have an impact on the size of precautionary sav-
ings.
To study this issue, we build a large overlapping generations model where house-
holds face uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. Agents live for a maximum num-
ber of periods, and retire at an exogenous age. In addition to idiosyncratic income
2risk, agents face a life cycle pro…le of mean earnings, and mortality risk after retire-
ment. All agents are ex-ante equal. Markets are incomplete by assumption, since
we only allow for one asset (later, we introduce a second asset, retirement accounts).
These features of the model are standard in the social security literature and corre-
spond closely to the assumptions in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995).
We depart from this literature by assuming that, because of lack of commitment,
…nancial intermediaries are only willing to lend to a worker the maximum amount of
resources that satis…es the rationality condition of no default for all possible values of
the income shock tomorrow. Consequently, individuals face state-speci…c borrowing
limits andthere is no default in equilibrium. This assumption has been usedby Zhang
(1997) and Fernandez Villaverde and Krueger (2002). Notice that in the incomplete
markets literature we are somewhere in between two well-established theories. On
one hand, there are papers which exogenously assume the number of assets (usually
one) and the borrowing constraint for each asset (in most cases, no borrowing). This
is the framework studied by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), in which most of
the social security literature is based on. On the other hand, the seminal paper by
Kehoe and Levine (1993), followed by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), assumes a full
set of contingent assets but with an endogenous borrowing limit in each, arising from
the lack of commitment from the borrower´s side. We do restrict the set of assets, as
in the …rst framework, but endogenize the borrowing limit, as in the second.1
We start from the steady state of our economy in a PAYG social security system
witha generous replacement rate. Each worker pays asocial security tax proportional
to her labor income when working, and collect bene…ts after retirement. We assume
thatthe bene…ts arethe sameforall retirees, independently oftheamount contributed
to the social security fund. Hence, social security plays an insurance role against
bad income shocks during the working life. Still, because of the type of market
incompleteness assumed, workershave toself-insureagainst short runnegativeincome
shocks throughprecautionary savings. Theexperiment is tocompare this steady state
to one in which the replacement rate is zero, so workers have also to build their own
savings for retirement.
We calibrate the model to U.S. data, solve for the stationary equilibria, and …nd
that when the borrowing constraints are exogenous eliminating social security has
important e¤ects on the capital stock and the saving rate. In contrast, when the
borrowing constraints are endogenous, the magnitude of the increase in the saving
rate is reduced (although not by a huge amount) and there is a debt boom. The
reason is that with the elimination of social security individuals have less incentives
to default on debts. The relaxation of borrowing constraints associated to this fact
1The formal properties of our framework have not been fully developed. We do not claim that
the resulting optimal debt contract is optimal in any meaningful sense. Moreover, we are aware of
a third alternative, which is a framework in which interest rates are type speci…c, maximize banks
ex-ante pro…ts, and there is default in equilibrium, as in Chatterjee et al. (2004). Adding this
default option is an interesting issue for future research.
3implies that the agents need to save less for precautionary reasons. This e¤ect goes
in the opposite direction to the traditional increase in savings associated with the
reform of public pensions.2
Our result goes in the direction of the empirical literature, which …nds that actual
experiences of social security reform around the world have had a small impact on
saving rates. The …rst privatization experience, Chile in 1981, has been used as a
textbook example of a successful reform. However, the aggregate e¤ects on the saving
rate show an increase of at most 10% in twenty years, of which is hard to disentangle
howmuchcomes fromcorporatesavings instead of households savings.3 UsingChilean
household level data, Coronado (2002) …nds that the saving rate increase by about
7% for rich families, while Butelmann and Gallego (2000) …nd an increase in debt for
low income households. It is still early to assess the results of the reform in other
Latin American countries, as Mexico and Peru, which reformed their systems in the
90s, but so far there is no evidence of increases in their saving rates while consumer
debt has signi…cantly increased. A ”rich” country which has been reforming its social
security system since 1986 is the U.K. Disney et al. (2003) …nd no trend in household
aggregate savings rate after the reform, while Granvick and Mallick (2002) …nds that
savings for retirement substitute other types of household savings, with no increase
in the aggregate saving rate.
One of the multipleproblemsincomparingthe predictions of the model withactual
reforms is that thesereforms do not look like the theoretical experiment of eliminating
the PAYG social security system. Inall the cases the government ensures a minimum,
less generous pension to all workers. Moreover, the reduction of the social security
replacement rate comes together with the creation of new …nancial instruments as tax
favoredretirementaccounts topromotesavings when young. Inthesecondpart of this
paper, we extend the basic model by introducing a second asset (retirement accounts)
and experiment with a more realistic social security reform. Again, the model with
endogenous borrowing constraints features a smaller increase in the saving rate after
the reform than the model with exogenous borrowing limits, and also a larger debt
boom. The di¤erences between the two models, however, are now very small, mostly
because in our model retirement accounts are protected against creditor claims upon
default, as itis inmost legislations. Evenifour explanation goesinthe right direction,
there is still a long way to go in order to understand why social security reforms do
2A previous attempt to incorporate endogenous borrowing constraints in social security models is
the work by Andolfatto and Gervais (2001). They use a three-period overlapping generations model
with no income risk to assess the role played by endogenous borrowing constraints in shaping the
aggregate e¤ects of social security. Their …ndings indicate that it is not quantitatively important
to model these constraints endogenously. The reason is that their model does not account for the
change in the magnitude of precautionary savings associated with the relaxation of borrowing limits
after the elimination of social security. In contrast, in our paper we account for this additional e¤ect
and …nd that is important for the question at hand.
3See Coronado (2002) for a review of the problems of backing up saving rates using macro data
in Chile.
4not lead to the huge increases in savings predicted by current models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of our
economy with only one asset and de…nes a stationary equilibrium for it. Section 3
explains the calibration procedure and show some features of our benchmark quan-
titative model. In Section 4, we perform the experiment of a social security reform
which eliminates social security bene…ts, comparing the e¤ects on the saving rates
with …xed (exogenous) borrowing constraints and endogenous borrowing limits. Sec-
tion 5 extends the model adding a second asset, retirement accounts, and analyzes a
more realistic social security reform. Finally, we conclude.
2 The Environment: One-Asset Economy
Our economy is inmany aspects similar fromthe economy described in Imrohorogluet
al. (1995). We work in a large overlapping generations setup, with mortality risk and
individual income risk. We also preclude for contingent markets, including markets
for annuities. Individuals save and borrow through only one asset, negative amounts
of which corresponds to unsecured debt. We depart from the previous literature,
however, by introducing limited commitment in the credit market. Individuals can
only commit to pay back their previous debt if it is optimal for them to do so,
compared to the option of default. In particular, we assume as in Zhang (1997) that
…nancial intermediaries are only willing to lend to a worker the maximum amount of
resources that satis…es the rationality condition of no default for all possible values
of the income shock tomorrow. Consequently, there is no default in equilibrium, and
individuals face state-speci…c, endogenously determined, borrowing constraints.
The main features of the model are the following. The economy is populated by
individuals that live for a maximum of I periods. Agents with age i 2 f1;:::;Ir ¡ 1g
are workers and provide ´e(i) e¢ciency units of labor to the market, where e is
an exogenously given e¢ciency pro…le and ´ is a stochastic shock. The transitions
across states of nature follow the stationary probability matrix ¼. Individuals with
age i ¸ Ir are retired, collect social security bene…ts (TRss) and face a probability of
surviving to the next period s(i) with s(I) = 0. Each agent which dies is replaced
by a newborn with age i = 1, employed. and with no assets. Total assets of dead
agents (liquid plus retirement accounts) are seized by the government.
Workers and retirees decide how much to consume (c) and save/borrow (a) to
maximize their lifetime utility. The one period utility function is of the class of
CRRA, with risk-aversion coe¢cient ¾ and discount factor ¯. In order to determine a
worker’s endogenous borrowingconstraint, we havetocomparethe continuation value
of paying back a loan of a given size, or defaulting. The latter implies a complete
discharge of the debt but also a punishment: defaulters are permanently excluded
form the credit market and can only save through a storage technology which yields
5no interest income. 4 We assume that retirees cannot borrow.
Workers pay a social security tax proportional to their labor income (¿ss). The
proceedings are used to …nance social security bene…ts, computed as a replacement
rate times the average wage in the economy. The social security system is self-
…nanced. The government also collects labor income taxes (¿), capital income taxes
(¿k) and unintended bequests from all agents and spends it in unproductive govern-
ment consumption (G) keeping each period a balanced budget. Finally, there is a
technology to produce the only good in the economy (Y ) using labor (L) and capital
(K), described by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
We consider only a stationary equilibrium, in which all prices and aggregate quan-
tities remain constant over time. This allows us to write the model in a simple
recursive language.
2.1 Consumer’s Problem
To characterize consumer´s problem, we …rst have to describe the continuation value
for agents that defaulted in their previous debtsand consequently are excluded from
the borrowing market and from the possibility of earning capital income on accumu-
lated liquid assets. This value is necessary to compute the endogenous borrowing
limit in the problem faced by consumers in equilibrium.
Value of default:
Let´s start with a retired individual in her last period of life (i = I). This agent
will consume all its income, given by the common social security transfer plus any






















0 = TRss + a
a0 ¸ 0
4This punishment is weaker than the one in Zhang (1997) and Kehoe and Levine (1993). In
these papers, defaulters revert to autarky, this is, they cannot borrow nor save in their remaining
periods of life. Such a harsh punishment would certainly work in our favor, although it might not be
realistic. We also explored the possibility of precluding defaulters only to borrow, allowing them to
earn interest income. It turned out that this punishment was too weak to sustain a positive amount
of debt in equilibrium, a result already suggested by Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989).
6Notice that this individual cannot borrow and does not earn interest income, as a
punishment from past behavior. Now let´s move to workers which defaulted in their
previous debts and are in their last period of working life (i = Ir ¡1). Their problem
is described by:
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s:t: c +a0 = (1¡ ¿)(1¡ ¿ss)´we(Ir ¡ 1)+ a
a
0 ¸ 0
with an additional state variable ´ representing their current income shock. The
problem is similar for workers at ages i = f1;:::;Ir ¡ 2g:
v¤









e (a0;i + 1;´0)
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s:t: c+ a0 = (1¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ¿ss)´we(i) +a
a
0 ¸ 0
with the probabilities ¼(´;´0) used to compute expectations about next period´s
income.
Consumer´s Problem with Endogenous Borrowing Constraints:
We are ready now to described the problem faced by consumers in equilibrium.
Again, we start with a retired agent in her last period of life (i = I):
vr (a;I) =
[TRss + (1+ r(1¡ ¿k))a+]
1¡¾
1¡ ¾
and at ages i = fIr;:::;I ¡ 1g:





+ ¯s(i)vr (a0;i + 1)
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s:t: c+ a
0 = TRss +(1 +r (1¡ ¿k))a
a0 ¸ 0
Notice that the only di¤erence with the default values is that retirees now earn some
interest income for their assets. A worker inher last period of working life (i = Ir¡1)
faces the problem








s:t: c+ a0 = (1¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ¿ss)´we(Ir ¡ 1) +(1+ r(1¡ ¿k))a
a
0 ¸ 0
again similar to the default value except for the interest income. The interesting
problem is the one faced by worker of age i = f1;:::;Ir ¡ 2g:











0 = (1 ¡ ¿)(1¡ ¿ss)´we(i)+ (1+ r(1 ¡ ¿k))a
a
0 ¸ ¡b(i)
where the endogenous borrowing constraint ¡b(i) satis…es the individual rationality
constraint:
minf¡b(i)jve (¡b(i);i + 1;´0) ¸ v¤
e (0;i + 1;´0)g 8´0 2 E
Workers are able to borrow only that amount of resources for which the value
of paying back this debt is no less than the value of defaulting next period for all
possible realizations of the income shock. This gives rise to an endogenous, age-
speci…c, borrowing constraint. Solving each of the previous problems, we obtain
optimal decision rules for consumption and next period assets for workers gc
e (a;i;´),
ga




Firms in this economy have access to a Cobb-Douglas production function that con-
verts capital and labor into (net) output:
Y = K®L1¡®¡ ±K
From …rm’s maximization problem we obtain the marginal conditions
w = (1 ¡ ®)K
®L
¡® r = ®K
®¡1L
1¡® ¡ ±
82.3 Aggregate Distribution and Law of Motion
Let ¹s(a;i;´) be the mass of consumers (agents) in situation s 2 fe;rg, with age


























The law of motion of the aggregate state variable is given by ¹0 = ¡(¹), and can
be de…ned using the optimal policy rules. In our stationary equilibrium, ¹ is a …xed
point of the operator ¡.
2.4 Government Budget
The government in our model faces two separate budgets, one for the social security
system and another for current expenditures. We assume that the two budgets are
balanced each period.
Social Security System:
Social security bene…ts are computed applying a replacement rate µ over the av-










This transfer is assumed to be the same for all retirees. An interesting extension is
to allow for some dependence of the transfer on each individual´s previous wages, as
in Storesletten et al. (1999). For simplicity, we abstract from this feature.
Since the social security system is assumed to be balanced, the total amount















The government also levies labor and capital income taxes and unintended be-
quests to …nance an exogenous level of government consumption. This part of the
budget is also assumed to be balanced, hence






















2.5 De…nition of a Stationary Equilibrium
A Stationary Equilibrium is a set of value functions, optimal decision rules, price
functions, a set of government policies, aggregate law of motion ¡, and invariant
distribution ¹ such that:
1. Given prices, taxes, transfers, and aggregate law of motion, consumers optimize
2. Price functions satisfy marginal conditions from …rm’s problem




1¡® ¡ ±K = C + K
0 ¡ K +G
where aggregate capital and labor is the sum of asset holdings and the supply






























5. The invariant distribution satis…es ¹ = ¡(¹):
103 A Quantitative Benchmark Economy
We calibrate the model above to reproduce some features of the U.S. economy during
the eighties. We chose that period since retirement accounts (IRA’s and 401(k)´s)
where still not available, and therefore the social security system was closer to the
pay-as-you-go system described in the model. Moreover, it had been in such a system
for a long time, so presumably the old generations had time to adjust their asset
holdings. We will talk later about the role played by retirement accounts and how do
they change the default incentives in our model.
3.1 Demographics and Employment Process
Each model period is taken to be 5 years. Individuals enter the economy at 20 and
may live until age 85 (model period 13). At each point in time individuals supply
e(i)´ units of labor. The exogenous pro…le of age speci…c e¢ciency units e(i) is taken
from Hansen (1993) and adjusted to our demographic setup through interpolation.
The results are presented in Table 1.
For the stochastic idiosyncratic labor shocks we use a discretized version of the
process estimated by Storesletten et al. (1999)5, with …ve states:
´ 2 E =
£









0:3684 0:3561 0:1989 0:0637 0:0129
0:2425 0:3165 0:2657 0:1321 0:0432
0:1177 0:2313 0:3021 0:2313 0:1177
0:0432 0:1321 0:2657 0:3165 0:2425









0:1509; 0:2217; 0:2548; 0:2217; 0:1509
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Finally, we assume that individuals survive with probability one until the age
of 65 (the retirement age) and after that age individuals may die according to an
5In their Table 1, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999) estimate a …rst order autoregressive
process for individual income with large persistence (½ = 0:935). This is the process that we
discretize using …ve states. Other studies have also relied on these estimates. For example, Conesa
and Krueger (1999) and Fernandez Villaverde and Krueger (2002) use a two-state and three-state
discretization of the same process, respectively. In Storesletten et al. (2001) the authors discuss
that the true process might be close to a unit root. This issue is relevant for our analysis, although
we don´t think the results would change by much.
11Table 1: Demographics in the Benchmark Economy
Period Age e s
1 20-24 0.36 1
2 25-29 0.46 1
3 30-34 0.53 1
4 35-39 0.59 1
5 40-44 0.63 1
6 45-49 0.64 1
7 50-54 0.64 1
8 55-59 0.61 1
9 60-64 0.56 1
10 65-69 0 0.54
11 70-74 0 0.52
12 75-79 0 0.44
13 80-84 0 0
age speci…c mortality probabilities pro…le taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
International Data Base. These probabilities have been slightly adjusted so as to
reproduce the U.S. dependency ratio (+65 over 20-64) of 21%, as shown in Table 1.
3.2 Government and Social Security taxes
The role of the government in our model economy is twofold. The …rst is to run a
pay-as-you-go social security system collecting taxes on labor earnings and paying
pensions to retirees. In the initial steady state (or the benchmark economy), we set
the social security replacement rate to 44%. Later, our experiment will be to reduce
this rate to zero. The associated social security tax rate that balances the pension
budget is 9.4%, a realistic number in the U.S. once Medicare and disability insurance
is taken away.
With respect to current expenditures, we set exogenously unproductive govern-
ment expenditures to be 20% of GDP, as in the U.S. data. We also set a capital
income tax of 35%, also consistent with the U.S. legislation. Given these numbers,
the labor income tax rate is set endogenously to balance the government budget. This
procedure implies a labor income tax of 17%, again a reasonable approximation for
the U.S. tax system.
12Table 2: Calibration of the Benchmark Economy
Parameters Calibration
Targets Results
® 0:360 rK/Y 0:360 0:360
¯ 0:994 K/Y 2:500 2:475
± 0:085 I/Y 0:210 0:211
¾ 2:100 Debt/Y 0:028 0:028
3.3 Other Parameters
The remaining parameters are simultaneously solved to match a set of targets for
the U.S. economy. In particular, the value of the capital share in output ®, the
risk aversion parameter ¾, the discount parameter ¯, and the depreciation rate ±
are simultaneously calibrated to match a capital share in income of 0.36, a capital
output ratio of 2.5, an investment rate of 21% and a debt-to-output ratio of 0.028
which corresponds to the ratio of revolving (unsecured) debt over GDPbetween 1980-
1989 in the U.S. (Federal Reserve Statistical Release). The results of the calibration
procedure (at a yearly frequency) are presented in Table 2
3.4 Assets, Debt, and Borrowing Limits in the Benchmark
Economy
The model economy has been calibrated to match certain key ratios of the US econ-
omy. Hence it reproduces by construction G/Y, I/Y and a realistic capital-output
ratio. The average age pro…le of asset holdings of the initial steady state is also con-
sistent with the empirical evidence. As seen in Figure 1, on average young individuals
start accumulating wealth until they reach the age of 60-64 and after they exhaust
those assets until they die. Notice also that young agents have on average negative
assets, so that the aggregate debt-to-output ratio is non-zero. We do obtain some
borrowing in equilibrium.
In our model, borrowing limits depends on the incentives to default on debts.
Notice also from Figure1 that young individuals face more relaxed borrowing limits,
since for these agents the cost of doing default is higher. The intuition is that agents
defaulting early in life lose access to (compounded) interestincome in all their savings,
compared to an old worker whose stock of savings is already built.
As in most models with incomplete markets, in our economy workers accumulate
assets for two reasons: life cycle considerations (including retirement) and precau-
tionary reasons, due to the positive probability of a long sequence of bad shocks
that would make individuals hit the borrowing constraint and start to reduce current
consumption. As we will see, in a world with endogenous borrowing constraints, the







Age Profile of Assets






Borrowing Constraint by Age
Age
Figure 1: Age Pro…le of Assets and Borrowing Constraints
e¤ects onprecautionary savings are key tounderstand the aggregate e¤ects ofchanges
in policy, as a social security reform.
4 E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security
We now study the e¤ects of a social security reform changing the replacement rate
from 44% to 0%. We will perform this experiment in two cases. In the …rst one,
we keep …xed the (endogenous) borrowing constraint of the benchmark economy,
consequently the change in the social security regime does not change the age speci…c
borrowing limits. We want to think of this case as the one analyzed in the previous
literature of social security (Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Conesa and Krueger (1999),
Fuster (1999), etc.). Incontrast, in the secondcase (labelled Endogenous Constraints)
borrowing constraints are allowed to adjust to the variation of default incentives
induced by the elimination of social security. The di¤erence between the results
in the two cases will give us an idea of the quantitative importance of endogenous
borrowing constraints in analyzing social security reform.
4.1 Fixed Borrowing Constraints
The results of this experiment can be seen in the top panel of Table 3. Notice that, as
in previous quantitative studies, the eliminationof the social security system increases
14Table 3: Aggregate E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security
Fixed Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0.00 –
¿ 0:17 0:15 –
K/Y 2:48 3:59 45:01
I/Y 0:21 0:31 45:01
Debt/Y 0:03 0:03 14:86
Endogenous Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0.00 –
¿ 0:17 0:15 –
K/Y 2:48 3:42 38:25
I/Y 0:21 0:29 38:25
Debt/Y 0:03 0:12 334:31
the capital-output ratio and the saving rate. The magnitude of this change, about
45%, is in line withother relatedstudies. For example, Imrohoroglu etal (1995) report
that changing the U.S. social security replacement rate from 40% to zero increases
the capital-output ratio by 42% in the model economy with zero population growth
and certain lifetimes, which is the closest environment to our paper. The increase
in the capital stock is due to several factors. First, individuals save more to …nance
consumption during the retirement period and to insure against income risk since
the social security bene…ts have been remove. And second, a PAYG pension system
partially substitutes for missing annuity markets. Consequently, without these public
pension bene…ts individuals have to save more in order to insure themselves against
the risk of living more than expected. Hence, the aggregate saving rate and the
capital-output ratio increases and the interest rate falls, increasing debt moderately.
4.2 Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
In the second case we perform the same experiment as before, i.e. eliminating the
PAYG pension system. In contrast to the previous case, borrowing limits adjust to
the change in individual incentives to default on previous debts. The results can
be compared in Table 3. As before, the removal of the pension gives incentives
to individuals to save more in order to …nance consumption when retired. This
mechanism increases the saving rate in the economy.
The key point, however, is that in this case the removal of social security bene…ts














Figure 2: Changes in Age Pro…le of Borrowing Constraints
also relaxes the borrowing limits agents faced by agents, as seen in Figure 2. The
intuition is that without social security individuals have to save on their own for
retirement. Then losing interest income on their savings upon default is more costly
and incentives to default are lower. The lower incentives to default translates into
more relaxed borrowing limits, in particular for young agents which still have to build
most of their savings for retirement.
Morerelaxedborrowingconstraintstranslate intolessprecautionary savings. Agents
save less for precautionary reasons in good states, since they can enter more easily
into debt in bad states. This e¤ect goes in the opposite direction to the conventional
increase in savings due to the need of self-…nancing for retirement. Therefore, in
contrast to an economy with exogenous borrowing constraints, the aggregate saving
rate and the capital-output ratio increases less with the removal of social security. In
particular, in our economy the capital-output ratio and the saving rate increases by
38% compared to the 45% increase with …xed borrowing limits. Consequently, the
introduction of endogenous borrowing constraints signi…cantly reduce the increase in
the saving rate due to the elimination of social security. Moreover, the social security
reform is followed by a debt boom, since young agents bene…t from more relaxed
borrowing limits to smooth consumption during life cycle.
16Table 4: E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security without Income Risk
Fixed Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0.00 –
¿ 0:22 0:18 –
K/Y 2:44 3:18 30:35
I/Y 0:21 0:27 30:35
Debt/Y 0:00 0:00 ¡
Endogenous Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0.00 –
¿ 0:22 0:18 –
K/Y 2:44 3:18 30:35
I/Y 0:21 0:27 30:35
Debt/Y 0:00 0:00 ¡
4.3 The Role of Idiosyncratic Income Risk
To further understand the importance of idiosyncratic income uncertainty when an-
alyzing the e¤ects social security on the incentives to default on debts, we performed
the same set of experiments in a model without income risk. For this, we set the
value of the stochastic shock to be always equal to its expected value. The rest of
the parameters for the benchmark remain the same. This experiment is important
to compare our previous results with the ones obtained by Andolfatto and Gervais
(2001), namely that in an OLG models without income risk there are no quantitative
di¤erences between modelling borrowing constraints exogenously or endogenously to
analyze the e¤ects of social security.
With the elimination of income risk, individuals do not have to self-insure against
bad shocks. Consequently, the initial steady state displays a lower capital-output
ratio, as observed in Table 4. With a lower capital stock the interest rate and the
cost of borrowing are higher, yielding a virtually zero debt-to-output ratio. After
the reform, the increase in the capital stock is now smaller because the elimination of
social security does not increase precautionary savings by much. This re‡ects the fact
that, without income risk, the PAYG social security system plays no insurance role
against lifetime earnings di¤erences. In addition, the di¤erences between the …xed
vs. endogenous constraints are almost zero: in our calibrated model, the elimination
of social security increases the saving rate by 30% in both cases.
The role of endogenous borrowing constraints in our model depends crucially on
the fact that, with income risk, more relaxed borrowing constraints give individuals
17less incentives to save for precautionary reasons. Abstracting from income risk shuts
down the main channel of our model and does not give a fair chance for endogenous
borrowing limits to matter.
5 Introducing Retirement Accounts
The social security reform analyzed in the previous section allows us to compare
our results with most of the current literature. However, this type of reform is a
theoretical extreme which does not correspond to the observed attempts to reform
social security in some Latin American and European countries. In all these cases,
the generosity of the government managed PAYG system is signi…cantly reduced,
but some form of retirement accounts are created instead to promote private savings
for retirement. There are three reasons why we should consider retirement accounts
as a di¤erent asset in our analysis: First, because they are less liquid, since early
withdrawal is either prohibited or subject to high penalties. Second, because they
receive an special tax treatment. Finally, and more importantly for our purposes,
because retirement accounts cannot con…scated by creditors upon default.
We extend the model to add retirement accounts, and perform the following ex-
periment. Staring from the same benchmark economy as before (with 44% social
security replacement rate and no retirement accounts), we now compare this steady
state to one without social security (zero replacement rate) but with the possibility
to save using retirement accounts. We believe this is a more realistic description of a
feasible, politically implementable, social security reform.
5.1 A New Environment with Two Assets
The …nal steady state of the experiment is described by a model with two assets.
Individual savings can now take the form of liquid assets (a) or retirement accounts
(d). We model retirement accounts following the general rules that characterize the
functioning of the most popular retirement accounts (401(k) and IRAs) in the U.S.,
whichare summarizedinAppendix A. Other countries (Chile, Mexico, UK, etc.) have
introduced similar …nancial instruments, di¤ering in the limits to contributions, tax
treatment, and penalties for early withdrawal.
In our second version of the model, only workers accumulate retirement accounts,
choosing a percent of their labor income as their deposit in each period. We impose
minimum (¢min) and maximum (¢max) contributions, as percent of individuals labor
income. This deposit is deducted from the current labor income tax. Retirement
accounts do not pay capital income taxes. Workers can withdraw from retirement
accounts, but paying a penalty (¿pen) proportional to the amount withdrew plus
the deferred income tax. Retired agents can withdraw from the retirement account
without paying the penalty, only the deferred income tax. There is a minimum
amount required to withdraw depending on age ($(i)). Finally, and this is a key
18point, retirement accounts are protected from creditors claims upon a bankruptcy
declaration. This means that an individual can maintain the full property of funds
invested in retirement accounts upon default.6
The newmodel features an interesting portfolio choice. Agents have to decide how
much to save in each type of asset. The liquid asset is more suitable for precautionary
reasons, since it can be used at no cost in the case of bad shocks. On the other hand,
retirement accounts are better instruments to save for retirement, because of the tax
incentives, but are less suitable to smooth consumption during worker’s life, since
early withdrawals are heavily penalized. This di¤erentiated role for the two assets
allows us to pin down the optimal portfolio choice.
Notice also that borrowing constraints are going to depend now not only on age,
but on the stock of retirement accounts. Everything else equal, we should expect
agents with more retirement accounts to face tighter borrowing limits for the liquid
asset. The reason is that, since retirement accounts cannot be con…scated upon
default, these agents savings for retirement are more protected and therefore the
punishment for default is less costly for them.
5.2 E¤ects of Social Security Reform
Suppose that aneconomy starts in aninitial steady state correspondingto our Bench-
mark economy, with a social security replacement rate of 44% and no retirement ac-
counts. The following reform is introduced: (i) the replacement rate is reduced to
10%, and (ii) a system of retirement accounts is created. We set the minimum and
maximum contributions to retirement accounts to 4% and 10% of worker’s labor in-
come, respectively. We also choose a penalty for early withdrawal of 50%, and follow
the same rules for minimum withdrawals after retirement as in the U.S. legislation.7
In Table 5, we analyze the steady state after the reform to the initial steady state.
As before, we perform one experiment with …xed borrowing constraints, and another
with endogenous borrowing limits. In both cases, the social security tax necessary
6The formalization of an equilibrium for this new environment is presented in Appendix B. The
resulting model is close to Imrohoroglu et al (1998), except that we abstract from the unemployment
state (in which early withdrawals from retirement accounts are allowed) and, of course, we use
endogenous borrowing constraints instead of a no borrowing restriction.
7The experiment does not intend to capture a particular experience of social security reform,
neither the current U.S. system. The parameters are chosen as to represent the average reform, just
as an illustrative example. For example, government in all countries ensure a minimum pension,
captured by our positive replacement rate. Neither the U.S. nor the U.K. have minimum contri-
butions to retirement accounts, but in Chile this is 10% of worker’s wages and in Mexico, around
6%. The maximum amount of tax deductible contributions is a di¢cult number to obtain, since
legislations set absolute instead of relative caps. Finally, in Chile and Mexico early withdrawals are
prohibited (except for unemployment or disability), while in the U.S. they are allowed with a 10%
penalty. See Piñera (1996) for a description of the Chilean system, Soliz (2003) for Mexico, and
Disney et al. (2003) for the U.K.
19Table 5: Social Security Reform with Retirement Accounts
Fixed Borrowing Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0:02 ¡7:33
¿ 0:17 0:19 1:55
K/Y 2:48 3:42 38:92
I/Y 0:21 0:29 38:92
Debt/Y 0:03 0:04 28:11
RA/K 0:00 0:54 –
Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
Initial S.State Final S.State Percent Change
¿ss 0:09 0:02 ¡7:33
¿ 0:17 0:18 1:40
K/Y 2:48 3:38 36:29
I/Y 0:21 0:29 36:29
Debt/Y 0:03 0:05 79:46
RA/K 0:00 0:52 –
to balance the PAYG part of the system is reduced from 9% to 2%, while the labor
income tax increases slightly from 17% to 18-19% to pay for tax deductions. The
reform increases workers disposable income, as intended.
The main results of this experiment in the model economy with retirement ac-
counts are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in the previous model economy
with one asset. That is, when borrowing constraints are allowed to change as a func-
tion of the di¤erent incentives to default, eliminating social security translates into
a less pronounced increase in the saving rate and a debt boom. However, in this
case, the di¤erences between the model with exogenous and endogenous borrowing
are less important. Endogenizing borrowing constraints, the capital-output ratio and
the saving rate increases by 36% compared to the 39% increase with …xed borrowing
limits
We expected to obtain this result for two reasons: First, with a positive replace-
ment rate the government provides for some insurance, therefore reducing the role
of precautionary savings. Second, retirement accounts are protected from creditors
claims upon default, so replacing the PAYGsystem with private savings through this
instrument is not going to have an important impact in the borrowing limits.
Still, since retirement accounts and liquid assets are imperfect substitutes, we do
observe in Figure 3 that borrowing constraints are less tight after the reform. Agents
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Figure 3: Changes in Borrowing Limits after Reform
which default on their debts can build savings for retirement without any punishment
throughretirement accounts, but still losetheinterest incomeontheir savings through
liquid assets, which are more suitable to protect them from bad income shocks in the
future when borrowing is precluded. More relaxed borrowing constraints translate
again into more debt and less precautionary savings, but not to the same extent as
in the model with only one asset.
Finally, notice that the optimal portfolio of households between liquid assets and
retirement accounts is similar (around half each) in the two setups. With endogenous
borrowing constraints one would expect individuals, facing more relaxed constraints
so they do not need to save much for precautionary reasons via the liquid asset, to
tilt their portfolio towards retirement accounts. However, if anything we observe the
opposite. The reason, as shown in Figure 3, is that accumulating retirement accounts
actually tightens worker’s borrowing constraints, for a given social security system.
Excessive savings in retirement accounts protects workers too much in the case of
default, making …nancial intermediaries less willing to lend them in equilibrium and
o¤setting the initial e¤ect of the reduction of the social security replacement rate.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that when borrowing constraints are endogenous and idiosyncratic
income risk is important, the magnitude of the increase in the capital to output ratio
21and the saving rate due to a social security reform is reduced. The reason is that
with the elimination of social security individuals have less incentives to default on
debts. The relaxation of borrowing constraints associated to this fact implies that the
agents need to save less for precautionary reasons, and this e¤ect goes in the opposite
direction to the traditional increase in savings associated with the reform of public
pensions.
From a quantitative perspective, the e¤ects are signi…cant but not large, especially
if we allow for retirement accounts protected from creditors upon default. Still, our
mechanism goes in the direction of the empirical literature, which …nds that current
models overestimate the impact of social security reforms on the saving rate.
There are two important directions for future research that we plan to pursue.
One is to move to a credit contracting framework in which interest rates are type
speci…c and there is default in equilibrium, as in Chatterjee et al. (2004). The e¤ect
of a social security reform on default rates is an interesting unexplored issue. Second,
it seems relevant to add a third asset to the model (as durables or housing) which
could be used as collateral for loans, in the direction of Fernandez Villaverde and
Krueger (2002). Then changes in the social security system might have an additional
impact on borrowing limits through the price of such an asset.
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24A The Basics of Retirement Accounts: The 401(k)
and IRAs
The…rst appendix describes brie‡y the current legislation on the two most important types
of retirement accounts in the U.S.: 401(k) and IRAs. We focus on the features of each plan
that are relevant for our model, as the limits to contributions, tax treatment, and penalties
for early withdrawal.
401(k): Employer-sponsored retirement accounts
A 401(k) plan is a retirement plan set up by an employer. It is a simple way to build up
retirement savings and get signi…cant tax bene…ts while an individual is working. When a
worker joins a 401(k), he agrees to contribute part of his salary to the 401(k) account. The
money contributed is deducted from the paycheck before income taxes are taken out, al-
though social security taxesarelevied over thegross wage beforededucting any contribution
to a retirement account. Consequently, a worker doesnot pay income taxeson contributions
and any interest it earn until the money is withdrawn from the account. Some employers
o¤er a match, meaning that for every dollar one contributes up to a certain amount, your
employer will also make a contribution (10 cents, 50 cents, a dollar - it depends on your
employer).
² Minimum Contributions: The existence of a minimum contribution to a 401k de-
pends on the rules of the particular plan. There is no federally imposed minimum
contribution to a 401(k), but many plans require participants to contribute at least
1-2 percent of their salary in order to o¤set administration costs.
² Maximum Contributions: Each company decides the contribution limits for its own
plan, within the IRS guidelines of a maximum individual contribution limit of 20%
(in 2001) of annual earnings or $10,500, and $35,000 maximum combined employer
and employee contribution limit (through the matching contributions), and the 25
percent of pay limitation.
² Withdrawals before 59.5 years old: If one is younger than 59.5, the amount with-
drawn in a yearsubject to incometax at yourcurrent incometax rateand a 10% early
withdrawal penalty unless one of the following conditions apply: A. If you become
totally disabled. B. If you die, and your bene…ciary collects the money. C. If you are
in debt for medical expenses that exceed 7.5 percent of your adjusted gross income.
D. If you are required by court order to give the money to your divorced spouse, a
child, ora dependent. E. Ifyou areseparated from service (through permanent layo¤,
termination, quitting or taking early retirement) in the year you turn 55, or later. F.
If you are separated from service and you have set up a payment schedule to with-
draw money in substantially equal amounts over the course of your life expectancy.
(Once you begin taking this kind of distribution you are required to continue for 5
25years or until you reach age 59.5, whichever is longer). If you do this, you would
pay ordinary income tax on the distributions but no 10 percent penalty. However,
this type of distribution may or may not be available to you under the terms of a
particular 401(k) plan, and for this reason we abstract from modelling this feature.
² Withdrawals after retirement: To make sure that most of the retirement bene…ts
are paid to you during your lifetime, rather than to your bene…ciaries after your
death, the payments that you receive from a retirement plan must begin no later
than your required beginning date (which is the retirement age or 70 and 1/2 if
you are not retired). The payments each year cannot be less than the minimum
required distribution. The minimum required distribution is computed by dividing
your account balance at retirement by the expected lifetime at that age. If the
actual distributions in any year are less than this minimum you are subject to an
additional tax, which equals 50% of the part of the minimum distribution that was
not distributed (this applies to a quali…es employee plan like the 401ks).
² Changing Jobs and Unemployment: Workers who just changed jobs or get unem-
ployed can rollover their previous retirement plans (e.g. 401(k)) to IRAs to continue
to bene…t from tax-deferred growth. Moreover, there is no penalty on the rollover
amount from the previous retirement plan to an IRA. This also means that a un-
employed individual cannot bene…t from an employer-sponsored retirement account
(401(k)) but can continue to invest in an individual retirement account which is also
a tax-deferred investment vehicle.
Traditional IRAs
An Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA), commonly called an Individual Retire-
ment Account, is a personal retirement savings plan available to anyone who receives tax-
able compensation during the year. For IRA contribution purposes, compensation includes
wages, salaries, fees, tips, bonuses, commissions, taxablealimony, and separatemaintenance
payments.
² Age Limit: Under some conditions, even a child can have an IRA. However, you can
no longer contribute money into your Traditional IRA when you have reached 70.5.
² Setting up: An IRA should be opened with a bank trust or custodial company.
² Contribution Limit: Thereis no lowerlimit forcontribution. There isan upperlimit
of $2,000 a year for the total amount in the IRAs under the same person’s name.
Moreover, if a person’s income is under $2000 in a particular year, the maximum
contribution for that year is 100% of his/her work income. (excluding rental income,
interest income, etc.). For a couple, the maximum total is $4000 with $2000 each.
If the joint income is below $4000, the maximum amount of contribution is 100%
of their joint work income. You cannot contribute money into your traditional IRA
when you have reached 70.5,
26² Tax Treatment: 1.Contributions to a traditional IRA is income tax deferred. The
interest earned in your traditional IRA is also income tax deferred. 2.Interest earned
in a traditional IRA is subject to income tax when the amount is withdrawn.
² Withdrawal: Withdrawing money from a traditional IRA is subject to thesamerules
as theemployer-sponsored retirement accounts(401(k)): Ifyou areyoungerthan 59.5,
the amount withdrawn this year is subject to income tax at your current income tax
rate and a 10% early withdrawal penalty unless you die or become disabled. If you
do not start withdrawing some required minimum amount from your IRA after you
have reached 70.5, you will be subjected to a 50% penalty.
² Workers who just changed jobs can rollover their previous retirement plans (e.g.
401(k)) to IRAs to continue to bene…t from tax-deferred growth. Moreover, there is
no penalty on the rollover amount from the previous retirement plan to an IRA.
² Individuals with a retirement plan at work (401k) can still have an IRA provided
that their modi…ed adjusted gross income satis…es one of the following conditions (in
2000): 1) between $52000 and $62000 for a married couple …ling jointly, 2) between
$32000 and $42000 for a single individual or head of household, or 3) between $0 and
$10000 for a married person …ling separately.
Bankruptcy
Finally, because both programs are personal investment programs for your retirement,
it is protected by pension (ERISA) laws, which means that thebene…ts may not be used as
security for loans outside the program. This includes theadditional protection of the funds
from garnishment or attachment by creditors.
27B The Model with Two-Assets
This appendix formalizes the descripion of the Two-Assets economy. For compactness, we
only present those equations and problems which di¤er to the corresponding expressions
in the One-Asset economy. We keep referring to a as the liquid asset, and introduce the
notation d for retiremnt accounts. We start with the consumer´s value functions (default
values and endogenous borrowing constraints) and then state the de…nition of equilibrium
for this economy.
Value of default:
a) Last period of life (i = I):
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Consumer´s Problem with Endogenous Borrowing Constraints:
a) Last period of life (i = I):
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De…nition of a Stationary Equilibrium:
A Stationary Equilibrium is a set of value functions, optimal decision rules, price func-






















1. Given prices, taxes, transfers, and aggregate law of motion, consumers optimize
2. Price functions satisfy marginal conditions from …rm’s problem












































































5. The invariant distribution satis…es ¹ = ¡(¹):
31